In A Cognitive Theory of Magic (2007: 181) , Jesper Sørensen characterizes magic as "a method of innovation" that utilizes "established means of contact [ing sacred domains] in order to achieve socially or individually specified purposes". As such, he argues, it facilitates the emergence not only of "new interpretations of existing rituals, but
[also] of whole new ritual structures". Magic, he concludes, is "deeply embedded in most religious rituals and … [a] major force … in the creation of new religious institutions" (2007: 186) . From a purely theoretical point of view, his argument is quite compelling.
For historians, however, his use of the terms "magic" and "religion" as second order (etic) concepts presents difficulties, especially in cases where historical subjects define magic pejoratively and use it to disparage the beliefs and practices of others. The problems are particularly evident in the context of the Protestant Reformation, where Sørensen too readily embraces the Protestant claim that the Protestant understanding of the Eucharist relied on "faith" in contradistinction to the Catholic understanding, which both Protestants and Sørensen view as dependent on magic.
The potential value of Sørensen's (2007) cognitive theory of magic for historical analysis of emergent social movements is more readily apparent if we extract it from longstanding academic discussions of "religion" and "magic" that are better relegated to the emic level and recast it in more generic terms applicable not only to ritual but to goal directed action more generally. Recast in this way, we can focus on Sørensen's chief contribution: the elaboration of the cognitive aspects of the process whereby people utilize ascriptions of non-ordinary power to achieve various (ordinary and non-ordinary) goals by incorporating them in temporally structured event-frames that have the potential to become new social movements. Doing so, allows us to use his work to develop more precise tools for analysing the cognitive dimensions of novelty and change across a range of cultural domains.
Recasting Sørensen's Cognitive Theory of Magic
Sørensen's theory builds on Lawson and McCauley's cognitive theory of ritual (McCauley and Lawson 2002; Lawson and McCauley 1990) , which situates ritual in the context of a cognitive approach to action more generally.
2 Sørensen (2007: 32) defines magic as effecting "the state or essence of persons, objects, acts, and events through certain special and non-trivial kinds of actions with opaque causal mediation". In contrast 2 McCauley and Lawson (2002: 8-9) indicate that, according to some definitions of religion, theirs may not be "a theory of religious ritual", but rather "only a theory about actions that individual and groups perform within organized communities of people who possess conceptual schemes that include presumptions about those actions' connections with the actions of agents who exhibit counter-intuitive properties". Their focus on "organized communities of people" with (presumably) agreed upon conceptual schemes that connect their actions with those of (presumed) non-ordinary agents sidesteps the historically interesting questions of how new conceptual schemes emerge and how people come to agree on them and in doing so constitute themselves as a community connected to agreed upon non-ordinary agents. It is this question that Sørensen's work begins to address from a cognitive perspective.
to actions with more transparent causal mediation, "in magical rituals, at least one element [whether an agent, an action, or an object] will be invested with the magical agency necessary for the ritual to have any effect " (2007: 65) . He draws from conceptual blending theory (2007: 51-61; Fauconnier and Turner 2002) to model religious and magical rituals, which he argues, involve "a blended space consisting of elements projected from … two general domains -'sacred' and 'profane' -and structured by a ritual frame" (Sørensen 2007: 63; see Fig. 2 , for a sample diagram). In magical rituals, "at least one element will be invested with the magical agency necessary for the ritual to have any effect, and this agency is constructed by a mapping between the sacred and the profane domain " (2007: 65) . He uses the elaborated conceptual blending model to
provide a more precise analysis of the ascription of magical agency and efficacy, which, he argues, effects "the transfer of power from the sacred to the blended space necessary in order to attain the change of state implied in the magical action " (2007: 65) . He develops a typology of magical actions (transformative and manipulative) and situates ritual action within event-frames that link actions to specific goals (2007: 95-140) .
Here I want to highlight the contribution that Sørensen's work can make not only to a theory of ritual but more broadly to the emergence of new social movements, whether conceived as religious or not. To appreciate its potential, his theory needs to be extracted from longstanding academic attempts to distinguish "religion" between "magic" as second-order concepts and recast in more generic terms. While such distinctions can and do play a potent role in debates within and between groups, as analysis of the Reformation Era debates makes evident, we will make more headway in synthesizing across related domains of inquiry and identifying underlying mechanisms, if we analyse first how cultural distinctions such as religion and magic are being made at the emic level, in keeping with standard historical practice, and then redescribe processes of interest in more generic terms in order to develop etic explanations. of a temporally structured event-frame" (Sørensen 2007: 148) . Although I would tend to assume with Sørensen (2007: 65) that the ascription of agency to a non-ordinary source typically involves a "displacement of [ordinary] agency and intentionally", I see no reason to assume that ritualization is the only way to trigger such a displacement; indeed, from the point of view of subjects, rituals may presuppose rather than trigger such displacements. 4 Thus, I see no reason to assume that the goal-directed actions in question expectation of conceptual change. "For systems we understand poorly or not at all, expect that, as an inquiry progresses -as we analyse inward and synthesize laterally -the concepts in terms of which we conceptualize high-level systemic capacities will be altered or eliminated" (Davies 2009: 32-33, 37 ). Davies draws this directive, which aptly describes what I am trying to do here, from the history of science. Thus, he writes: "We make progress in our knowledge of natural systems to the extent we analyze inward and identify low-level systemic mechanisms and interactions that instantiate high-level capacities. We also make progress as we synthesize laterally across related domains of inquiry, as we look for coherence among taxonomies of mechanisms postulated in associated areas of study. Such analyses and syntheses serve as checks on our theories and as mutual checks on one another" (36-37, emphasis in original). Davies' approach builds on the understanding of levels and mechanisms that informs explanations in the natural sciences, as discussed by Bechtel and Richardson (2000) and Bechtel (2009) . Since my primary concern in this paper is to synthesize laterally across related domains of inquiry as a check on theory and as a precondition for specifying more precise constitutive mechanisms (operative at the next lower level), I use "constituent processes" to refer to processes that inform higher-level phenomena, rather than "mental mechanisms", in order to avoid (for now) the technical questions of what constitutes a mental mechanism (as discussed, for example by Craver 2007: 2-8) and the need to specify precisely how the mechanism works. 4 People also make such ascriptions in the context of play. Some theorists view ritual as a special form of adult play (e.g., Luhrmann 1989 and Sharf 2005) , grounding it in the work of Vygotsky and Winnicott (see Taves 2009: 159) . People also make ascriptions as a result of conscious deliberation, within the context of recognized group processes, whether intellectual, political, or otherwise. At other times, however, people make spontaneous ascriptions under conditions they consider ordinary and unmarked, that is, in contexts in which they insist that they were not ritualizing or playing or fantasizing or Weber (1978: 399-400) argues, depending on "the greater or lesser ordinariness of the phenomena in question". Behaviours that seem out of the ordinary may lead subjects to infer the presence of non-ordinary powers, which they may then use both to effect and explain presumed changes. Weber (1978 Weber ( : 399-400, 1133 refers to the extraordinary powers that people ascribe to persons and objects as "charisma" in much the same way that Sørensen uses magical agency to refer to special powers that people ascribe to persons, objects, and actions.
Replacing the labels chosen by Sørensen (magical agency) and Weber (charisma) with a more generic formulation has two distinct advantages: it allows us to analyse how people use various first order terms on the ground without confusing the emic and etic levels and it makes overlapping theoretical interests at the etic level more evident. In this case, Sørensen's characterization of "magical agency" as a special kind of agency and
Weber's definition of "charisma" in terms of "extraordinary powers" point to an obvious underlying generic discourse having to do with ordinariness (non-ordinary, extraordinary) and specialness, on the one hand, and agency understood minimally as the power to effect change, on the other. 5 Avoiding the culturally-loaded labels allows us to specify the process that is of common theoretical interest: the ascription of powers, which people perceive as special or non-ordinary, to persons, objects, and actions and to which they then attribute causal efficacy relative to goal directed actions (event frames).
This reformulation allows us to focus on Sørensen's chief contribution: the elaboration of the cognitive aspects of the process whereby people make and utilize ascriptions of non-ordinary power to achieve various (ordinary and non-ordinary) goals by incorporating them in temporally structured event-frames that have the potential to become new social movements. We can begin with the three things that Sørensen suggests are needed to create a new magical ritual "(a) agreement between a few people on the existence of certain counterpart connections, (b) the infusion of magical agency 5 My adoption of "specialness" as an alternative second-order formulation was directly inspired by my engagement with Sørensen's work (see Taves 2009: 161-62) . For a discussion of Weber's distinction between the charismatic and the ordinary, see Eisenstadt 1968: xxxiv-xxxvii). For a discussion of problems surrounding the concept of agency, and specifically "human agency", see Davies (2009) . We can distinguish between at least three different kinds of agency that scholars (and those we study) may ascribe to individual or collective things.
(1) The capacity to act intentionally, which presupposes an awareness of awareness, and, thus, the ability to give reasons for why one acts. Agents with the capacity to act intentionally don't always use it, however, and are responsible for many unintended actions for which they cannot give reasons. (2) The capacity to act, which presupposes at least some primitive level of awareness or animation, but not conscious intentionality. (3) The capacity to produce an effect, which does not require awareness or animation (Taves 2013: 84) . -frame" (2007: 187, emphasis in original). Assuming that Sørensen didn't mean to limit agreement among "a few people" to the first point, we can revise this to read: a few people need to agree on (a) the presence of "magical agency", which we can describe more generically as a special kind of agency that people attribute to something (Y) located in a non-ordinary (mythic) realm, (b) the existence of counterpart connections that link the special agency of Y to something (X) in the ordinary realm, and (c) the efficacy of the special agency (attributed to Y and linked to X via a counterpart connection) relative to the goal specified by the event-frame. As Sørensen indicates, a few people have to agree on these points (the existence of the special kind of agency, the counterpart connections, and the structure of the event-frame) for any sort of collective action to occur.
and (c) its embedding as the instrumental cause in an event
Stressing that "magical agency" is attributed, which Sørensen recognizes, makes it obvious that people often attribute special agency to things (whether persons, events, experiences, objects, etc.,) without forming new groups or creating new rituals. For a group to emerge in relation to such an attribution, an individual's ascription of nonordinary powers to a thing has to be recognized by others. It has to generate an interpretive consensus among a few people as to what occurred, which in turn constitutes them as a group and the occurrence as an "originatory event". The group, however, will only generate a collective ritual if they agree that the originatory event or some aspect of it can be re-created in the present (Taves 2009 , Table 1 .3). Given that, they then have to agree, as Sørensen indicates, both on the specific counterpart connections that can or should connect the originatory event to the present and the conditions that can or should be considered causally effective in the event-frame.
The insertion of these additional steps reveals the chief limitation of both 
Analysing Reformation Era Debates Over Ritual Efficacy: an Overview
I can illustrate the advances that Sørensen's work allows us to make, as well as the ironies it engenders with respect to a theory of "magic", in light of the rise of various Protestant forms of Christianity in the context of sixteenth-century controversies over the Eucharist. In emic terms, these controversies represented debates over the nature of the sacraments, and, in the context of the Eucharist or Lord's Supper, debates over the sense in which Christ could be said to be present. In the terms adopted here, these controversies can be understood as conflicts over the efficacy of various ritual practices relative to the goal of making Christ present within the ritual event-frame of the Eucharist or Lord's Supper.
In these sixteenth century debates, the various parties agreed that true religion should be distinguished from false beliefs and practices, variously labelled as superstition, magic, and sorcery. They generally understood "superstition" as referring to "the worship of the true God by inappropriate and unacceptable means" (Cameron 2010: 3). The terms "magic" and "sorcery" were often used alongside "superstition" to designate means that they considered "inappropriate and unacceptable". 6 As Cameron points out (2010: 3), "all of these were labeling expressions: none had a secure frame of reference apart from the values, presuppositions, and preferences of those who used them".
In the course of the sixteenth-century controversies, reformers drew selectively from extant, late medieval critiques of superstition and magic to mount a critique of Catholic Eucharistic practice (Cameron 2010: 143-44) . In mounting this critique, they relied on definitions of superstition and magic that reflected their presuppositions regarding the relationship between spirit and matter and that in turn shaped early social scientific definitions of religion and magic (Styers 2004 
Points of Contention: Interpreting the Actions of the Divine in illu tempore
Although in all cases the words of institution were used to forge connections between the mythic past and the ritual space, the nature of the connections rested on how the referenced passages were interpreted, thus on the interpretation of what took place in the mythic past. To understand how these disputes gave rise to new religious bodies The words of institution not only generated counterpart connections between the events of the last supper and the event-frame of the Eucharist, the recounting of Jesus'
instruction to "this do in remembrance of me" supplied the event frame for the ritual as a whole. Thus, the goal of the event was the "remembrance of me" and "this do" was the means of arriving at the goal. The preposition "in" understood as "in order to" linked the means with the goal, deeming it efficacious. Most of these words raised contentious issues of interpretation in the context of Reformation Era debates (Wandel 2006: 6-10) .
! "Doing this" was understood as having to do with the "taking and eating", which in ! "In" linked the "doing of this" (in illu tempore and in the present) with the goal of "remembering me". In linking the two, it signaled that "doing this" (whatever it was) again would effectively accomplish the goal of "remembering me". This basic counterpart connection was not disputed.
! "Remembrance of me" ([King James]; meam commemorationem [Latin Vulgate]) was understood as a reference to the goal or purpose of "doing this". "Me" was understood to refer to Jesus, whom all parties to the debates understood as the Christ (i.e. God incarnate). All parties to the disputes in question, thus, agreed that it was Christ who was "remembered" by "doing this". They all even agreed that remembering made Christ present in some sense; it was the sense in which doing this made Christ present -whether "really" or simply in memory, whether bodily or spiritually -that was at the center of the dispute.
Differences were fought out on two major fronts: between Catholics and
Protestants over the meaning of the last supper in relation to Jesus crucifixion (interpreted by all as "his sacrifice on the cross") and between all parties over the sense in which The second debate, which not only precipitated disagreement between Catholics and Protestants but also between Protestants, focused on Jesus's words at the last supper (and thus practically on the meaning of "this is my body"). The Swiss reformer, Ulrich
Zwingli, argued that Luther interpreted the word "is" too literally and in doing so perpetuated "the delusion that the bread is flesh and the wine blood" (Zwingli 1526: 186) .
To avoid this, Zwingli and others in the Reformed tradition reconceived the linkage between bread and body in a manner that approached, but probably did not fully embrace, the symbolic in Peirce's technical sense. Yet the Reformed Protestant rejection of a real bodily presence in the bread should not obscure their embrace of alternative conceptions of presence derived from the new iconic counterpart connections that Protestants made between communicants and the disciples. Although Protestants characterized these connections emically as "faith" rather than "magic", they can be construed etically as 
Counterpart Connections and Proximal Causes
At the 22 nd Session of the Council of Trent, which was devoted to a discussion of the "Most Holy Sacrifice of the Mass", the Council specified that the Passover meal celebrated by Jesus and his disciples was to be interpreted as a priestly sacrifice in which the priest (Jesus) offered himself as the sacrifice. In the words of the Council: In this interpretation of "this do", the interpretation of "this" as a ritual sacrifice presided over by a priest is obviously crucial. As both sacrificer (the priest who offers the sacrifice) and that which was sacrificed (the offering or "victim"), the Catholic interpretation of Jesus' last supper provides a model for the human agent (priest), the objects (bread and wine), and the action (the words of institution). Thus, in Sørensen's terms, the reenactment of the original sacrifice in the present is based on an iconic counterpart connection based on perceived similarities between the two events. The counterpart connection is in turn legitimated by a line of succession running from Jesus to "His apostles, whom he constituted as priests of the New Testament", to priests properly ordained in a ritually constituted lineage, i.e. apostolic succession. This lineage ensured that the priest, who celebrated the Mass, was himself linked iconically to Christ and could pronounce the words "this is my body" in the role of Christ, thus replicating not only the sacrifice but also the sacrificer sacrificing himself. It was not the priest as individual, who effected the transformation of the bread and wine, though the intentions of the priest were crucial, but the words of Christ spoken by the priest in the role of Christ that did so (Sørensen 2007: 85-87) .
Thus, to sum up, in the Catholic view, a human male can be ritually constituted as a priest through the sacrament of ordination (Fig. 2, A1-3 ). This establishes an iconic connection between him and Christ [the special agent] allowing him to mimetically assume the role of Christ whose word it is that transforms (Fig. 2, B1-3 ). The elements so transformed (Fig. 2, C3) were understood "to contain the grace that they signify", in this case, the power to sanctify [the goal of the event-frame], and to confer that grace effectively upon any who did not place "an obstacle" (Latin, obex, i.e. a sinful act or disposition) in the way (Canons 6-7, Waterworth 1848: 55).
Luther and the Protestant reformers who followed him configured the counterpart connection differently, focusing on the words "this cup is the new testament in my blood, which is poured out for you and for many for the forgiveness of sins", which Luther construed as the promise of a testator, rather than as the sacrifice of a priest (LW2: 20-23, 36-38). Where sacrifice was the key word for post-Tridentine Catholics, the word from which all else flowed in Luther's view was "testament", as in "new testament", which he interpreted as "a promise which implies the death of him who makes it" (LW2: 38 (Wandel 2006: 103) .
The shift from sacrifice-of-a-priest to promise-of-a-testator was linked to different ways of conceiving those whom Christ addressed at the last supper. In the Catholic interpretation codified at Trent, which linked Heb. 3:1 ("Jesus, the apostle and high priest of our confession") with Luke's account of the last supper (Lk. 22:14), Christ's words were addressed to "His apostles". In the Protestant interpretation, which reflects the words of institution actually used by both, Christ's words are addressed to "his disciples", as in "Jesus took bread … and gave it to his disciples and said …" (for the words of institution, see LW2: 36-37, 319). Moreover, the wine is explicitly "poured out for you
[disciples] and for many", which Protestants construed as all who believed in the promise (i.e. Christ's disciples in an extended sense). 9 Although the use of the terms apostles (apostolos) and disciple (mathetes) in the New Testament is complex, the former was the narrower term, often limited by later tradition to the "twelve apostles", such that the apostles were all disciples, but not all disciples were apostles. 10 This subtle shift in wording, which undercut the Catholic doctrine of apostolic succession, signaled a critical shift in counterpart connections. Where Catholic teaching made a counterpart connection between Christ and the apostles as priests and the celebrant, Luther forged a counterpart connection between Christ's disciples and the communicant (Fig. 3, C1-3 ). This shift, which was adopted by subsequent Protestant reformers, lay at the heart of the Protestant Reformation.
The shift in focus from priest/minister to communicant highlighted the role of In making this shift, Protestant reformers did not reject the idea of priesthood, but extended it to all ("the priesthood of all believers") on the basis of baptism, rather than to a select group on the basis of ordination. Citing I Peter, Luther insisted: "we are all priests, as many of us as are Christians. But the priests, as we call them, are ministers chosen from among us [with our common consent]" (LW 2: 112-13, 116-117). Luther, thus, rejected the Catholic claim that "Christ ordained the apostles to the priesthood", which in his view, "separated [clergy and laity] from each other farther than heaven from earth, to the incredible injury of the grace of baptism and to the confusion of our fellowship in the gospel" (LW2: 112). Where Catholics were taught to perceive an iconic counterpart connection between Jesus and the priest as successor to the apostles via ordination (understood in terms of apostolic succession), Protestants were tacitly taught to perceive an iconic counterpart connection between themselves and Jesus's disciples constituted by baptism (understood in terms of the priesthood of all believers). In both systems, the proximate power to transform the bread and wine was derived from a prior ritual -ordination for Catholics and baptism for Protestants -that McCauley and Lawson (2002: 18-19) refer to as enabling rituals.
In their respective understandings of the two enabling rituals, we see the action that each attributed to God, which in turn provided the rationale for their understanding of the Eucharist. Thus, baptism, for Luther, was the acceptance in faith of God's promise of salvation (LW2:58-59). Luther stressed that the agent who baptizes is "Christ himself, The basic points of agreement among Protestants are summed up in Fig. 3 . Line A1-A2 represents the human response to an action attributed to a deity (God's promise of salvation), which constitutes the believing person as a priest. Line C1-C2 represents the iconic connection between the ritual action of the communicant and the mythic action of the disciples in response to "the Word of the promising God", i.e. Christ, at the last supper (B2). Although the minister recounts "the Word of the promising God" to the congregants in the context of the ritual, this does not change the bread and wine (hence the absence of a connection between B1 and B2). The change in the elements (D1) occurs at D3 in the blended space, where it is effected (proximally) by the believers who consume them in faith (C3). While Protestants agreed that the minister was not the proximate cause of change in the elements and that Christ was present in some sense in the elements-consumed-in-faith, the sense in which Christ was present in the elements (D3) was disputed. 
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Material anchor which this was the case. The shift in the proximate cause of the presence, thus, meant that Catholics understood Christ as present in all properly consecrated wafers, while Protestants understood Christ to be present only in consecrated wafers that were consumed by the faithful. With this shift, Luther and the Protestants more generally rejected the whole panoply of Catholic devotions related to the "Blessed Sacrament" and thus by extension a wide range of practices by means of which Catholics continued to expect that they could experience Christ as really present.
The shift from ordination to baptism as the proximate source of the power to transform the elements had even more radical implications, which Luther forthrightly acknowledged. In -as he claimed --wrongly separating clergy and laity, Luther blamed the sacrament of ordination for "establishing of all the horrible things that have been wrought hitherto in the church" (LW2: 112). Indeed, he said, "unless I am greatly mistaken, if this sacrament and this lie fall, the papacy itself with its characters will scarcely survive" (LW2: 117). Luther hoped for a response from the pope and engagement with the system he was criticizing, but wound up instead spending much of his energy clarifying his views in response to the "misunderstandings" of other reformers who rejected his understanding of the sense in which Christ was really present in the Eucharist (Wandel 2006: 98-102) .
Protestant debates over the sense in which Christ was present in the Eucharistic elements were complicated. In arguing against the Catholic view, Luther maintained a tension between the Word (the promise of God) and the sacramental signs (water in the case of baptism and bread and wine in the Eucharist), criticizing earlier theologians for focusing on "the sign or sacrament" and neglecting "the testament and word of promise" (LW2:44). Although he questioned the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, Luther continued to maintain that Christ was bodily present in the elements consumed in faith, when challenged on this point by more radical reformers, such as Ulrich Zwingli, beginning in the 1520s. Two delegations of reformers, led by Luther and Zwingli, met at Marburg 1529 to attempt to resolve their differences. While they resolved some, they failed to agree on the nature of Christ's presence in the Eucharist (LW4: 5-14).
The heart of the disagreement lay in their interpretation of the word "is" in "this is my body", which Zwingli argued had to be understood as "figurative and symbolical" rather than literal (Zwingli 1526: 199) . Although Zwingli viewed the bodily presence of Christ in the Eucharist as symbolic in a sense that was similar, if not identical to that of Peirce, he did not reject the idea of Christ's spiritual presence in the Eucharist (see Zwingli, 1526: 208-209; Stephens 1986: 218-59) . Distinguishing more sharply than Luther between the divine and human natures of Christ, he viewed Christ's human nature as circumscribed and his divine nature as omnipresent (see LW3:xvii-xx). As human, Christ was physically present (incarnate) in the man Jesus, appeared physically to the disciples after his death, and then -as stated in the Nicene Creed -ascended bodily into heaven where he "sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty" (Zwingli 1526: 186) . In his human nature, he therefore could not be bodily present in the bread, since humans cannot be in two places at once. As divine, however, Christ was omnipresent; as such, he was spirituality present in the Eucharist for those who received it in faith (Zwingli 1526: 212-13) . Since in this conception Christ's spiritual presence in the Eucharist depended solely on the spiritual presence of Christ in the hearts of believers, Luther accused Zwingli of entirely "remov[ing] the body and blood of Christ from the bread and wine, so that it remains no more than mere bread, such as the baker bakes" (LW2: 336). Zwingli claimed that this was not the case; although viewed materially, it was only bread; in terms of its use, it was something more (Stephens 1986: 248) .
Subtle disagreements on this last point notwithstanding, Zwingli's critique highlights a central divide that emerged between Reformed Protestants, on one hand, and both Catholics and Lutherans, on the other, concerning whether Christ could be seated "at the right hand of the Father" in heaven and at the same time be physically present in the sacrament. Catholics and Lutherans thought he could, though both traditions had difficulty explaining how he did it, while Reformed Protestants thought he could not.
Writing several decades later, Calvin mediated between the Lutheran and Zwinglian views (Janse 2009 ). Assuming the Zwinglian claim that Christ was bodily present in heaven, he (Calvin 1559: 4.17 .31) chided those "who conceive no presence of flesh in the Supper unless it lies in the bread". In doing so, he argued, "they leave nothing to the secret working of the Spirit, which unites Christ himself to us. To them Christ does not seem present unless he comes down to us. As though, if he should lift us to himself, we should not just as much enjoy his presence!" The Reformed traditions that followed Calvin expected the Holy Spirit to carry believers "above all things that are visible, carnal and earthly", so that they could "feed upon the body and blood of Christ Jesus, once broken and shed for us but now in heaven and appearing for us in the presence of his Father" (Scots Confession, quoted in Wandel 2006: 188) . In the Reformed traditions that followed Calvin, it is thus the Holy Spirit that effects the communion between the believer and Christ's ascended body, through the faith of the communicant.
Magic and Religion as Concepts of Dubious Descent
In light of the preceding analysis, we can draw several conclusions about the disputants' (emic) understanding efficacy. First, all parties viewed their own Eucharistic practice as efficacious relative to the goal of communion with Christ. In each case, a change was effected that allowed believers to experience the presence of Christ. The proximate cause of the change was attributed either to the intentions of the priest (Catholic) or the faithful (Protestant). In no case, however, was the proximate cause considered efficacious in its own right. Although they offered different explanations of how their practices exerted their efficacy and set different requirements for achieving efficacy, they all ultimately attributed the efficacy of their own practices to divine agency, whether God, Christ, or the Holy Spirit.
Second, based on their disparate readings of scripture, all parties concluded that their rivals' practices were not efficacious. Catholics and Protestants understood efficacy differently. For Catholics, efficacy was attributed to the words spoken by the priest insofar as the priest was understood to be speaking mimetically as Christ, a power granted to him by sacramental ordination. Sixteenth-century Protestants construed the efficacy accorded to the words of institution spoken by the priest as magical and contrasted it with the ostensibly non-magical efficacy of faith in a promise contained in the Word/words of Christ. In the context of the Reformation, Protestants hammered out a distinction between religion and magic in which magic was associated with practices deemed efficacious in themselves (i.e. automatic) and religion with the (non-automatic) power of the deity to effect what was promised when it was received in faith.
Although emic charges of magic and superstition swirled around the question of whether Christ was bodily present in the Eucharistic elements, emic definitions should not obscure the broad reach of etic Sørensen's definition, which includes not only changes in the state or essence of objects that people attribute to non-ordinary agents, but also changes in persons and events. Here I have argued that Protestants shifted the meaning of "the thing signified" from sacrifice to promise and in doing so precipitated a new understanding of who effected the change proximally (communicants who received the promise in faith rather than the sacramentally ordained priest) and what ritually enabled the change (salvation and priesthood received by all who believed at baptism rather than priesthood conferred on successors of the twelve apostles at ordination).
Regardless of whether or how Christians enjoyed the bodily presence of Christ in the Eucharist, Protestants made an indexical connection between the believer and the Christ/Word received at baptism and iconic connections between communicants and disciples in the Eucharist. These counterpart connections supplied the underlying structure of the Protestant Eucharistic ritual just as the indexical and iconic connections noted by Sorensen structured the Catholic ritual. By shifting the thing signified from sacrifice to promise, Protestants undercut the distinction between clergy and laity, deprived the clergy of a role in effecting the change in the elements, and limited any change in the elements to wafers consumed by the faithful. In doing so, they eliminated much of what Protestants emically construed as "magic", i.e. a person saying words that "automatically" made the deity present in a material object.
If we shift to a second-order definition of magic, such as that advanced by Sørensen, we can reframe the Reformation Era debates differently. From this perspective, it is clear that all parties to the debates ascribed non-ordinary power to Jesus' words at the last supper, which they believed could and should be replicated in some sense in the present. In that sense, they all ascribed "magical" properties to Jesus's words. They disagreed, however, in their interpretation of what Jesus was doing when he spoke the words (sacrificing or promising) and, thus, on the means of replicating that effect in the present. Viewed from the second-order perspective advanced by Sørensen, the "magical" efficacy that Protestants attributed to the communicants' "faith" in God's promise to act through the sacrament (thus, circumventing the need for sacramentally ordained priests) fueled the emergence of new forms of Christianity (new religious traditions) with new ritual structures and symbolic elaborations.
As I have been indicating throughout, I see no evidence to suggest that calling the powers in question "magical" (or "religious" or "charismatic") adds anything but confusion at the etic level. Both "religion" and "magic" are what Davies (2009) would call "concepts dubious by descent", that is concepts implicated in worldviews and historic contestations that may not be particularly useful in terms of furthering knowledge at the etic level. In light of the "conserving effects of cultural institutions and human psychology", Davis suggest that " [we] do not make it a condition of adequacy on our philosophical theorizing that we preserve or otherwise 'save' [such] concept[s]". Rather, he encourages us to bracket such concepts with "the expectation that [they] will be explained away or vindicated as inquiry progresses -as we analyse inwardly and synthesize laterally" (Davies 2009: 42-43) . The key thing to recognize, as I see it, is that people had a goal -in this case, realizing the presence of Christ -and a variety of competing means that they considered efficacious for realizing the goal. The tools that Sørensen has assembled from Peirce's semiotics, Lakoff and Johnson's conceptual metaphor theory, and Fauconnier and Turner's conceptual blending theory, when added to the analytic framework laid out by Lawson and McCauley, nonetheless allow us to analyse the cognitive processes involved in such actions with more precision.
Conclusion
From a cognitive perspective, an analysis of a concrete instance, such as the Reformation Era debates over the Eucharist, illustrates the importance of abandoning concepts of dubious descent (e.g., magic) in our etic formulations and the value of synthesizing laterally across related domains of inquiry in order to identify constituent processes that inform higher-level interactions. Synthesizing laterally revealed parallels between Weber's definition of "charisma" and Sørensen's definition of "magic", which then allowed us to recast these culturally loaded labels more generically as references to powers that people perceive as special or non-ordinary. This in turn allowed us to analyse situations in which people ascribe non-ordinary powers to things, consider what particular things (persons, events, objects, etc.) they ascribe them to, and the effects they attribute to such powers in the context of goal directed action. Here I have been particularly interested in testing Sørensen's claim that such attributions play a crucial role in the formation of new movements that center on new ritual practices.
To get at this, I added to the agreements that Sørensen suggested were necessary to generate a new ritual, focusing in particular on the need for (at least) a small group to arrive at an interpretive consensus with respect to event that they view as "originatory", i.e. as revealing the presence of non-ordinary powers, and agreement that the "originatory event" or some aspect of it can and should be recreated in the present. In the Reformation Era disputes over the Eucharist, all parties agreed that there was an originatory event. Generally speaking, it was the incarnation, death, and resurrection of the deity and the associated claim that Jesus was the Christ. More specifically, it was the "last supper", in which Jesus called upon his followers to "do this in remembrance of me". Given these conditions, we could then -following Sørensen's lead -consider the counterpart connections that people used to connect the special agency perceived in the originatory event to the present and the conditions under which people viewed the special agency as effective.
To understand how new movements form around new rituals, I argued that we needed to pay more attention to disputes over the interpretation of the originatory events, since, as McCauley and Lawson note, it is the "hypothetical religious rituals" of the gods to which people appeal in the course of carrying out their rituals and in generating new ones. Here I argued that Luther's reinterpretation of the last supper as a promise rather than a sacrifice redefined the counterpart connections between the originatory/mythic event (the last supper) and its ritual reenactment. Although some Protestants disputed Luther's claim that Christ was bodily present in the Eucharistic elements, they did not question the new counterpart connections he proposed and indeed relied on them to general alternative understandings of Christ's presence. In that sense, the shift in counterpoint connections laid the foundation for the emergence of Protestantism as a movement.
For historians of religion, the schematic depiction of constituent processes offered here does not diminish the importance of dynamic contextual interactions. As Sørensen and I both stress and as McCauley and Lawson assume, groups constituted by collective rituals presuppose the agreements discussed here. Identifying basic cognitive processes, such as conceptual blending, action representation systems, event-structures, and cognitive schemas, allows us to identify shifts at this more basic level that when agreed upon (or tacitly adopted) can structure widespread change. Although the dynamic historical interactions that lead to or preclude such agreements are the basic "stuff" of historical analysis, use of cognitive tools to describe underlying shifts allows us to describe the process of change in more basic and generic terms. These underlying processes provide a more adequate basis for setting up comparisons of the working out of such processes, such as those that lead to the formation of new social movements, both within and across cultures and time periods.
